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Tabela de conteúdos
Books
The Geometry of Ecological Interactions: Simplifying Spatial Complexity
Games on Grids
Axelrod views neighbors as role models whose behaviour can be imitated. Or differently: each cell being taken over by an offspring of the previous owner or of one of the neighbours, depending on who did best in the previous generation - a kind of colonization.
Dynamics in human and primate societies
The evolution of cooperation in an echological context: and agent-based model
J. W. Pepper and B. B. Smuts, p.45
Anti-chaos, common property, and the emergence of cooperation
Wave Patterns in Spatial Games and the Evolution of Cooperation
Trajectories to Complexity in Artificial Societies: Rationality, Belief, and Emotions
J. E. Doran
Agent-based artificial societies at least enable us to examine the coherence of the various theories of the origins of sotial complexity that have been proposed, while including details of cognitive processing. It may be even possible to gain original insights. The complexity of the system as a whole has made it very difficult to achieve a comprehennsive understanding of its behaviour by systematic experimentation.
Artificial societies are tipically heavily parameterized, with explicit parameters merely the “tip of the iceberg” of implicit assumptions. Among the relevant cultural beliefs that habitually and, perhaps wrongly, are taken for granted are […] that rationality is the ideal and the norm.
Meeting the Challenge of Complexity
Proceedings of a Special Workshop on Land-Use/Land-Cover Change, 2001 Eds. D. C. Parker and T. Berger and S. M. Manson
Why I no longer work with agents: a challenge for abms of human-environment interactions
H. Couclelis
Evolution and the theory of Games
J. M. Smith
``But if there are three or more pure strategies, there may be no ESS. (p. 19)
Problem with his model: ``Individuals do not move far from far from where they were born. (p. 20)
Bourgeois: if owner play Hawk, otherwise play dove (p. 22)
Stable Strategies: ESS (Evolutionary), DSS (Developmentally), CSS (Culturally)
Games of Life
K. Sigmund
Must the offsprinf inherit the same strategy? Not necessarily. It need not be innate in the first place […] other ways of spreading are conceivable - spreading by imitation […] or by infection (p. 169)
a population may seem to exhibit highly variable behaviour, although all its members adopt the same strategy: if you are weak, retreat; if you are strong, escalate. This strategy is conditional, but not mixed. (p. 173)
Reinhard Selten states that in asymmetric games, there can be no evolutionary stable strategies which are mixed. Essentialy, this is because a strategy can never encounter copies of itself.
M. Smith: only surrender signals allow reliable prediction.
“Escalate if you are owner; if not, not”. An intruder should make a stand for it, since this means no real risk. “Bourgeois”: there will be no escalated conflict at all; disputes are settled as if by consent.
Recent experiences count more than past.
Sickening as it literally is, this experiment dispels the widely held belief that any stimulus can be used to teach any response.
