https://estatistica.c3sl.ufpr.br/ 2026-05-16T20:27:26+00:00 https://estatistica.c3sl.ufpr.br/ https://estatistica.c3sl.ufpr.br/lib/exe/fetch.php/wiki:dokuwiki.svg text/html 2007-01-26T12:53:27+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://estatistica.c3sl.ufpr.br/doku.php/pessoais:pedro:definicoes?rev=1169816007&do=diff Equilibrium An n-tuple [...] such that each player's mixed strategy maximizes his payoff if the strategies of the others are held fixed. Thus each player's strategy is optimal against those of the others.“ Nash Equilibrium (NE) must exist for all finite games with any number of players. Until Nash, this had only been proved for 2-player zero-sum games by von Neumann and Morgestern. text/html 2007-10-23T11:59:39+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://estatistica.c3sl.ufpr.br/doku.php/pessoais:pedro:ler?rev=1193140779&do=diff Assuntos spatial equilibrium models ricardian equivalence (“tax now” or “tax later”) Papers Parker, D., Berger, T. and Manson, S., editors. 2002. Agent-based models of land-use and land-cover change. LUCC Report Series, 6, Indiana University.