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--- pessoais:pedro:ler [2007/01/27 00:43] – pedro
+++ pessoais:pedro:ler [2007/10/23 09:59] (atual) – pedro
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 ==== Assuntos ====
 spatial equilibrium models
+ricardian equivalence ("tax now" or "tax later")
 ==== Papers====
-Marietto, M., David, N., Sichman, J. and Coelho, H. 2003. Requirement analysis of agent-based simulation platforms: State of the art and new prospects. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence:125-141.
 Parker, D., Berger, T. and Manson, S., editors. 2002. Agent-based models of land-use and land-cover change. LUCC Report Series, 6, Indiana University.
@@ Linha 15: / Linha 14: @@
 Mertens and Lambin, 2000. land cover-change trajectories in southern cameroon. annals of the association of american geographers, 93, 467-494.
 (um modelo economico)
@@ Linha 260: / Linha 253: @@
 if it is not series-parallel. More generally, Pareto inefficient equilibria occur in a network if and only if one
 of three simple networks is embedded in it.//
-===A random matching theory===
-[[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/geb/aliprantis_random_matching_06.pdf|C.D. Aliprantis and G. Camera and D. Puzzellob, 2006]]
-//We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics
-of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions.
-A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational
-constraints.//
 ===Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence===
@@ Linha 318: / Linha 303: @@
+===Noncooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition===
+H. Bester, 1989.
+Econometrica
+//The paper presents a bargaining approach to spatial competition. Sellers compete by
+choosing locations in a market region. Consumers face a cost to moving from one
+place to another. The price od the good is determined as the perfect equilibrium
+of a bargaining game between seller and buyer. In this game, the consumer has the
+outside option to move to another seller so that prices at all stores are
+independent. Existence od a location-price equilibrium is established. The
+outcome approaches the perfectly competitive one if the consumer's costs of
+traveling become negligible or if the number of sellers tends to infinity.//
+===The Evolution of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations===
+S. Bowles and H. Gintis, 2003
+//How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low
+level of genetic relatedness among group members? We suggest that many
+humans have a predisposition to punish those who violate group-beneficial
+norms, even when this reduces their fitness relative to other group members.
+Such altruistic punishment is widely observed to sustain high levels of cooperation
+in behavioral experiments and in natural settings. It is known that if
+group extinctions are sufficiently common, altruistic punishment may evolve
+through the contribution of norm adherence to group survival. Additionally,
+those engaging in punishment of norm violators may reap fitness benefits if
+their punishment is treated as a costly signal of some underlying but unobservable
+quality as a mate, coalition partner, or opponent. Here we explore a
+different mechanism in which neither signaling nor group extinctions plays a
+role. Rather, punishment takes the form of ostracism or shunning, and those
+punished in this manner suffer fitness costs.
+We offer a model of this behavior, which we call strong reciprocity: where
+members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, strong
+reciprocators obey the norm and punish its violators, even though they receive
+lower payoffs than other group members, such as selfish agents who violate
+the norm and do not punish, and pure cooperators who adhere to the norm
+but free-ride by never punishing. Our agent-based simulations show that,
+under assumptions approximating some likely human environments over the
+,000 years prior to the domestication of animals and plants, the proliferation
+of strong reciprocators when initially rare is highly likely, and that
+substantial frequencies of all three behavioral types can be sustained in a
+population.//
+===Generous and Greedy Strategies===
+[[|B. Carlsson and S. Johansson, 1998]]
+//We introduce generous, ecent-matched, and greedy strategies as concepts for
+analyzing games. A two person prisioner's dilemma game is described by the
+four outcomes (C,D), (C,C), (D,C) and (D,D). In a generous strategy the
+proportion of (C,D) is larger than (D,C), i.e. the probability of facing
+defect is larger than the probability of defecting, An event-matched strategy
+has the (C,D) proportion approximately equal to that of (D,C). A greedy
+strategy is an inverted generous atrategy. The basis of the partition is that
+it is a zero-sum game given that the sum of the proportions of strategies (C,D)
+must equal that of (D,C). In a population simulation, we compare the PD game
+with the chicken game (CG), given complete as well as partial knowledge of the
+rules for moves in the other strategies. In a traffic intersection example, we
+expected a co-operating generous strategy to be successful when the cost for
+mutual collision was high in addition to the presence of uncertainty. The
+simulation indeed showed that a generous strategy was successful in the CG part,
+in which agents faced uncertainty about the outcome. If the resulting zero-sum
+game is changed from a PD game to a CG, of if the noise level is increased, the
+sucessful strategies will favor a generous strategy rather an even-matched or
+greedy strategy.//
+===Spatial and Density Effects in Evolutionary Game Theory===
+[[|R. Cressman and G. T. Vickers, 1996]]
+//Two models are considered for the study of game dynamics in a spatial domain.
+Both models are continuous in space and time and give rise to reaction-diffusion
+equations. The spatial domain is homogeneous but the mobility of the individuals
+is allowed to depend upon the strategy. The models are analysed for spatial
+patterns (via a Turing instability) and also for the direction of the travelling
+wave that replaces one strategy by another. It is shown that the qualitative
+behaviour of the two models is quite different. When considering the existence
+of spatial patterns and deciding whether increased mobility is helpful or not,
+it is shown that the answers depend crucially upon the model equations. Since
+both models (in the absence of spatial variation) are quite standard, it is clear
+that considerable care has to be exercised in the formulation of spatial models
+and in their interpretation.//
+===Modern Game Theory: Deduction vs. Induction===
+[[|A. Greenwald, 1997]]
+The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to present a survey of the theory
+of games, and secondly, to contrast deductive and inductive reasoning in game
+theory. This report begins with an overview of the classical theory of
+strategic form games of complete information. This theory is based on the
+traditional economic assumption of rationality, common knowledge of which
+yields Nash equilibrium as a deductive solution to games in this class. In the
+second half of this paper, modern game-theoretic ideas are introduced. In
+particular, learning and repeated games are analyzed using an inductive model,
+in the absence of common knowledge. In general, inductive reasoning does not
+gives rise to the Nash equilibrium when learning is deterministic, unless initial
+beliefs are somehow fortuitously chosen. However, computer simulations show that
+in the presence of a small random component, repeated play does indeed converge
+to Nash equilibrium. This research is of interest to computer scientists
+because modern game theory is a natural framework in which to formally study
+multi-agent systems and distributed computing.
+===Self-organized Criticality in Spatial Evolutionary Game Theory===
+[[|T. Killingback and M. Doebeli, 1997]]
+//Self-organized criticality is an important framework for understanding the
+emergence of scale-free natural phenomena. Cellular automata provide simple
+interesting models in which to study self-organized criticality. We consider the
+dynamics of a new class of cellular automata which are constructed as natural
+spatial extensions of evolutionary game theory. This construction yields a
+discrete one-parameter family of cellular automata. We show that there is a range
+of parameter values for which this system exhibits complex dynamics with long
+range correlations between states in both time and space. In this region the
+dynamics evolve to a self-organized critical state in which structures exist on
+all time and length scales, and the relevant statistical measures have power
+law behaviour.//
+===Concentration of Competing Retail Stores===
+[[|H. Konishi]]
+//The geographical concentration of stores that sell similar commodities is
+analyzed using a two-dimensional spatial competition model. A higher
+concentration of stores attracts more consumers with taste uncertainty and low
+price expectations (a market-size effect), while it leads to fiercer price
+competition (a price-cutting effect). Our model is general enough to allow
+for the coexistence of multiple (possibly) asymmetric clusters of stores. We
+provide sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of equilibrium store location
+choices in pure strategies. Through numerical examples, we illustrate the
+trade-off between the market-size and price-cutting effects, and provide
+agglomeration patterns of stores in special cases.//
+===Discrete Time Spatial Models Arising in Genetics, Evolutionary Game Theory, and Branching Processes===
+[[|J. Radcliffe and L. Rass, 1996]]
+//A saddle point method is used to obtain the speed of first spread of new
+genotypes in genetic models and of new strategies in game theoretic models. It is
+also used to obtain the speed of the forward tail of the distribution of farthest
+spread for branching process models. The technique is applicable to a wide range
+of models. They include multiple allele and sex-linked models in genetics,
+multistrategy and bimatrix evolutionary games, and multitype and demographic
+branching processes. The speed of propagation has been obtained for genetics
+models (in simple cases only) by Weinberger [1, 2] and Lui [3-7], using exact
+analytical methods. The exact results were obtained only for two-allele,
+single-locus genetic models. The saddle point method agrees in these very
+simple cases with the results obtained by using the exact analytic methods.
+Of course, it can also be used in much more general situations far less tractable
+to exact analysis. The connection between genetic and game theoretic models is
+also briefly considered, as is the extent to which the exact analytic methods
+yield results for simple models in game theory.//
+===Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining===
+[[|N. Schofield and R. Parks]]
+//In the model presented here, n parties choose policy positions in a space Z
+of dimension at least two. Each party is represented by a "principal" whose true
+policy preferences on Z are unknown to other principals. In the first version of
+the model the party declarations determine the lottery outcome of coalition
+negotiation. The coalition risk functions are common knowledge to the parties.
+We assume these coalition probabilities are inversely proportional to the
+variance of the declarations of the parties in each coalition. It is shown that
+with this outcome function and with three parties there exists a stable, pure
+strategy Nash equilibrium, z* for certain classes of policy preferences. This
+Nash equilibrium represents the choice by each party principal of the position
+of the party leader and thus the policy platform to declare to the electorate.
+The equilibrium can be explicitly calculated in terms of the preferences of the
+parties and the scheme of private benefits from coalition membership. In
+particular, convergence in equilibrium party positions is shown to occur if the
+principals' preferred policy points are close to colinear. Conversely, divergence
+in equilibrium party positions occurs if the bliss points are close to
+symmetric. If private benefits (the non-policy perquisites from coalition
+membership) are sufficiently large (that is, of the order of policy benefits),
+then the variance in equilibrium party positions is less than the variance in
+ideal points. The general model attempts to incorporate party beliefs concerning
+electoral responses to party declarations. Because of the continuity properties
+imposed on both the coalition and electoral risk functions, there will exist
+mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We suggest that the existence of stable, pure
+strategy Nash equilibria in general political games of this type accounts for the
+non-convergence of party platforms in multiparty electoral systems based on
+proportional representation.//
+===Stability of Spatial Equilibrium===
+[[|T. Tabuchi and D. Zeng, 2001]]
+//We consider interregional migration, where regions may be interpreted as clubs,
+social subgroups, or strategies. Using the positive definite adaptive (PDA)
+dynamics, which include the replicator dynamics, we examine the evolutionary
+stable state (ESS) and the asymptotic stability of the spatial distribution of
+economic activities in a multiregional system. We derive an exact condition
+for the equivalence between ESS and asymptotically stable equilibrium in each
+PDS dynamic. We show that market outcome yields the efficiency allocation of
+population with an additional condition. We also show that interior equilibria
+are stable in the presence of strong congestion diseconomies but unstable in the
+presence of strong agglomeration economies with further condition.//
+===Spatial Games with Adaptive Tit-for-Tats===
+[[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/tzafestas00.pdf|E. S. Tzafestas, 2000]]
+//This paper presents an adaptive tit-for-tat strategy and a study of its
+behavior in spatial IPD games. The adaptive tit-for-tat strategy is shown
+elsewhere to demonstrate high performance in IPD tournaments or individual
+IPD games with other types of strategies, and obtains higher scores than the
+pure tit-for-tat strategy. In spatial IPD games, the strategy exhibits stability and
+resistance to perturbations, and those properties are more pronounced in
+variations of the spatial game model that induce some degree of “noise” :
+probabilistic winning, spatial irregularity and continuous time. The adaptive tit-
+for-tat strategy is also compared to pure tit-for-tat and found to be more stable
+and predominant in perturbed environments.//
 ==== Journals ====
@@ Linha 336: / Linha 531: @@
 Caípitulo 2 do Russel sobre agentes.
-==== Authors ====
+==== Pages ====
-===Jaime Simão SICHMAN===
+Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard University)
-Vale uma olhadela no site deste cara.
+==== Authors ====
-E professor da USP Poli com interfaces com Portugal e Franca e no Brasil na area de
-Multi-agentes.
-http://www.pcs.usp.br/~jaime/#projetos
 ===Samuel Bowles===
-with  **Suresh Naidu**: Institutional Equilibrium Selection by Intentional Idiosyncratic Play, 2004
+with  **Suresh Naidu**: [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/bowles_institutional_equilibrium.pdf|Institutional Equilibrium Selection by Intentional Idiosyncratic Play]], 2004
+with **Hebert Gintis**: [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/bowles_inheritance_of_inequality.pdf|The inheritance of inequality]], 2002
-with **Hebert Gintis**: The inheritance of inequality, 2002
+=== Portugali e Benenson===
+Segregação

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