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| Ambos lados da revisão anteriorRevisão anterior | |||
| pessoais:pedro:doutorado:livros [2007/07/12 16:52] – pedro | pessoais:pedro:doutorado:livros [2008/01/11 10:06] (atual) – pedro | ||
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| Linha 9: | Linha 9: | ||
| Turtles: [[http:// | Turtles: [[http:// | ||
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| - | =====The Complexity of Cooperation===== | ||
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| - | ====Evolving New Strategies==== | ||
| - | Axelrod tournament. | ||
| - | Genetic algorithm (Holland 92). Gens implementing a " | ||
| - | strategy given the last three payoffs. The strategies always evolve to something near | ||
| - | TFT. Sexual reproduction helps the search process. | ||
| - | |||
| - | ====Coping with Noise==== | ||
| - | Axelrod tournament with 1% of noise (invert one's action). | ||
| - | // | ||
| - | next generation will be proportional to that's rule score in the previous | ||
| - | generation. | ||
| - | // | ||
| - | previous round. | ||
| - | // | ||
| - | defection (that can arise because of the noise), contrite. | ||
| - | CTFT is better than GTFT is better than GPavlov is better than Pavlov. | ||
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| - | ====An Evolutionary Approach to Norms==== | ||
| - | n-player game. //A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals | ||
| - | usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way.// | ||
| - | When somebody escalates, the other players may perceive and then punish. It leads to | ||
| - | cooperation some times, but not always. But, if the observer that does not punish | ||
| - | can be punished by another player (a // | ||
| - | and almost always punishing behaviour. He also studies norms between different groups | ||
| - | (white and black, for instance). | ||
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| - | |||
| - | ====Choosing sides (and) Setting Standards==== | ||
| - | Theory of landscapes. Two groups where each agent belongs to one of them. Each turn, one | ||
| - | agent may exchange its group in order to enhance its satisfability. Each pair of agents has | ||
| - | a symmetric satisfability value. | ||
| - | The main purpose of ABM is not prediction but a deeper understanding of how fundamental | ||
| - | social process operate. | ||
| - | There is a Nash Equilibrium because if someone individually exchange its location, | ||
| - | it will be worse to him. | ||
| - | |||
| - | ====Building new Political Actors==== | ||
| - | //It takes as given the existence of lower-level actors, and generates higher-level | ||
| - | actors from the interactions among them. [...] The heart of the model is a tribute | ||
| - | system in which an actor can extract resources to extract still more resources.// | ||
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| - | One agent may ask another for demand or fight. If it would cost less than paying | ||
| - | then fight is the best option. | ||
| - | A combat between two nations implies in each one loosing 25% of the other' | ||
| - | Agents can join or leave groups according to their decisions (subservience, | ||
| - | friendship, hostility). | ||
| - | 8 agents in a one-dimensional circular grid, each on having two neighbours. | ||
| - | The model has different results in each run, and the author analyses 3 of them. | ||
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| - | ====Disseminating Culture==== | ||
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| - | ====Replication of ABM==== | ||
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| - | ====Resources for ABM==== | ||
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| =====The Geometry of Ecological Interactions: | =====The Geometry of Ecological Interactions: | ||
