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Ambos lados da revisão anteriorRevisão anteriorPróxima revisão | Revisão anterior | ||
pessoais:pedro:doutorado:livros [2007/06/28 11:45] – pedro | pessoais:pedro:doutorado:livros [2008/01/11 10:06] (atual) – pedro | ||
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Turtles: [[http:// | Turtles: [[http:// | ||
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- | =====The Complexity of Cooperation===== | ||
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- | ====Evolving New Strategies==== | ||
- | Axelrod tournament. | ||
- | Genetic algorithm (Holland 92). Gens implementing a " | ||
- | strategy given the last three payoffs. The strategies always evolve to something near | ||
- | TFT. Sexual reproduction helps the search process. | ||
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- | ====Coping with Noise==== | ||
- | Axelrod tournament with 1% of noise (invert one's action). | ||
- | // | ||
- | next generation will be proportional to that's rule score in the previous | ||
- | generation. | ||
- | // | ||
- | previous round. | ||
- | // | ||
- | defection (that can arise because of the noise), contrite. | ||
- | CTFT is better than GTFT is better than GPavlov is better than Pavlov. | ||
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- | ====An Evolutionary Approach to Norms==== | ||
- | n-player game. //A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals | ||
- | usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way.// | ||
- | When somebody escalates, the other players may perceive and then punish. It leads to | ||
- | cooperation some times, but not always. But, if the observer that does not punish | ||
- | can be punished by another player (a // | ||
- | and almost always punishing behaviour. He also studies norms between different groups | ||
- | (white and black, for instance). | ||
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- | ====Choosing sides (and) Setting Standards==== | ||
- | Theory of landscapes. Two groups where each agent belongs to one of them. Each turn, one | ||
- | agent may exchange its group in order to enhance its satisfability. Each pair of agents has | ||
- | a symmetric satisfability value. | ||
- | The main purpose of ABM is not prediction but a deeper understanding of how fundamental | ||
- | social process operate. | ||
- | There is a Nash Equilibrium because if someone individually exchange its location, | ||
- | it will be worse to him. | ||
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- | ====Building new Political Actors==== | ||
- | //It takes as given the existence of lower-level actors, and generates higher-level | ||
- | actors from the interactions among them. [...] The heart of the model is a tribute | ||
- | system in which an actor can extract resources to extract still more resources.// | ||
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- | One agent may ask another for demand or fight. If it would cost less than paying | ||
- | then fight is the best option. | ||
- | A combat between two nations implies in each one loosing 25% of the other' | ||
- | Agents can join or leave groups according to their decisions (subservience, | ||
- | friendship, hostility). | ||
- | 8 agents in a one-dimensional circular grid, each on having two neighbours. | ||
- | The model has different results in each run, and the author analyses 3 of them. | ||
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- | ====Disseminating Culture==== | ||
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- | ====Replication of ABM==== | ||
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- | ====Resources for ABM==== | ||
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=====The Geometry of Ecological Interactions: | =====The Geometry of Ecological Interactions: | ||
Linha 103: | Linha 45: | ||
Among the relevant cultural beliefs that habitually and, perhaps wrongly, are taken for granted | Among the relevant cultural beliefs that habitually and, perhaps wrongly, are taken for granted | ||
are [...] that rationality is the ideal and the norm. | are [...] that rationality is the ideal and the norm. | ||
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- | =====Meeting the Challenge of Complexity===== | ||
- | [[http:// | ||
- | Eds. D. C. Parker and T. Berger and S. M. Manson | ||
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- | ====Why I no longer work with agents: a challenge for abms of human-environment interactions==== | ||
- | //H. Couclelis// | ||