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Ambos lados da revisão anteriorRevisão anteriorPróxima revisão | Revisão anterior | ||
pessoais:pedro:doutorado:livros [2007/02/05 13:23] – pedro | pessoais:pedro:doutorado:livros [2008/01/11 10:06] (atual) – pedro | ||
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- | ======Books====== | + | =====Ecologia===== |
+ | Odum | ||
- | ====The Complexity of Cooperation==== | + | ====Population Dynamics==== |
- | ===Evolving New Strategies=== | + | [[http:// |
- | Axelrod tournament. | + | |
- | Genetic algorithm (Holland 92). Gens implementing a " | + | |
- | strategy given the last three payoffs. The strategies always evolve to something near | + | |
- | TFT. Sexual reproduction helps the search process. | + | |
- | ===Coping with Noise=== | + | Tordos in [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/figures/tordos-1955.jpg|1955]] |
- | Axelrod tournament with 1% of noise (invert one's action). | + | |
- | // | + | |
- | next generation will be proportional to that's rule score in the previous | + | |
- | generation. | + | |
- | //Generosity//: | + | |
- | previous round. | + | |
- | //Contriction//: cooperate after the others defects in response to one's | + | |
- | defection (that can arise because of the noise), contrite. | + | |
- | CTFT is better than GTFT is better than GPavlov is better than Pavlov. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | ===An Evolutionary Approach to Norms=== | + | |
- | n-player game. //A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals | + | |
- | usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting | + | |
- | When somebody escalates, the other players may perceive and then punish. It leads to | + | |
- | cooperation some times, but not always. But, if the observer that does not punish | + | |
- | can be punished by another player (a //metanorm//), the model always converge to a coperative | + | |
- | and almost always punishing behaviour. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | + | ||
- | ===Choosing sides=== | + | |
- | Theory of landscapes. Two groups where each agent belongs to one of them. Each turn, one | + | |
- | agent may exchange its group in order to enhance its satisfability. Each pair of agents has | + | |
- | a symmetric satisfability value. | + | |
- | The main purpose of ABM is not prediction but a deeper understanding of how fundamental | + | |
- | social process operate. | + | |
+ | Turtles: [[http:// | ||
=====The Geometry of Ecological Interactions: | =====The Geometry of Ecological Interactions: | ||
- | ====Games on Grids==== | + | ====Games on Grids, Chapter 8==== |
[[http:// | [[http:// | ||
Linha 46: | Linha 19: | ||
who did best in the previous generation - a kind of colonization. | who did best in the previous generation - a kind of colonization. | ||
- | ====Wave Patterns in Spatial Games and the Evolution of Cooperation==== | + | ====Wave Patterns in Spatial Games and the Evolution of Cooperation, Chapter 17==== |
[[http:// | [[http:// | ||
Linha 72: | Linha 45: | ||
Among the relevant cultural beliefs that habitually and, perhaps wrongly, are taken for granted | Among the relevant cultural beliefs that habitually and, perhaps wrongly, are taken for granted | ||
are [...] that rationality is the ideal and the norm. | are [...] that rationality is the ideal and the norm. | ||
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- | =====Meeting the Challenge of Complexity===== | ||
- | [[http:// | ||
- | Eds. D. C. Parker and T. Berger and S. M. Manson | ||
- | |||
- | ====Why I no longer work with agents: a challenge for abms of human-environment interactions==== | ||
- | //H. Couclelis// | ||