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pessoais:pedro:doutorado:artigos [2007/11/07 14:19] – pedropessoais:pedro:doutorado:artigos [2008/01/14 14:18] (atual) – pedro
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 ======Papers====== ======Papers======
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 ====Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run==== ====Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run====
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 The major conclusion that we can draw out of these results is that both free-riding The major conclusion that we can draw out of these results is that both free-riding
 and cooperating are active principles. and cooperating are active principles.
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-====The Evolution of Strategy Variation: Will an ESS Evolve?==== 
-[[http://leg.est.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/evolution/will_an_ess_evolve.pdf|S. H. ORZACK, W. G. S. HINES]] 
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-//Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) models are widely viewed as predicting the strategy of an individual 
-that when monomorphic or nearly so prevents a mutant with any other strategy from entering the population. In fact, 
-the prediction of some of these models is ambiguous when the predicted strategy is ‘‘mixed’’, as in the case of a sex 
-ratio, which may be regarded as a mixture of the subtraits ‘‘produce a daughter’’ and ‘‘produce a son.’’ Some models 
-predict only that such a mixture be manifested by the population as a whole, that is, as an ‘‘evolutionarily stable 
-state’’; consequently, strategy monomorphism or polymorphism is consistent with the prediction. The hawk-dove 
-game and the sex-ratio game in a panmictic population are models that make such a ‘‘degenerate’’ prediction. We 
-show here that the incorporation of population finiteness into degenerate models has effects for and against the evolution 
-of a monomorphism (an ESS) that are of equal order in the population size, so that no one effect can be said to 
-predominate. Therefore, we used Monte Carlo simulations to determine the probability that a finite population evolves 
-to an ESS as opposed to a polymorphism. We show that the probability that an ESS will evolve is generally much 
-less than has been reported and that this probability depends on the population size, the type of competition among 
-individuals, and the number of and distribution of strategies in the initial population. We also demonstrate how the 
-strength of natural selection on strategies can increase as population size decreases. This inverse dependency under- 
-scores the incorrectness of Fisher’s and Wright’s assumption that there is just one qualitative relationship between 
-population size and the intensity of natural selection.// 
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-[[http://leg.est.ufpr.br/~pedro/figures/will_ess_evolve.jpg|Evolution increasing population size]] 
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-=====Spatial Games===== 
  
  
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 agents that will solve the problems mentioned above and present a prototype of an Interface agents that will solve the problems mentioned above and present a prototype of an Interface
 Agent for the Drawing tool of the Smallworld GIS.// Agent for the Drawing tool of the Smallworld GIS.//
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 =====LUCC===== =====LUCC=====
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 ====Spatially explicit experiments for the exploration of land-use decision-making dynamics==== ====Spatially explicit experiments for the exploration of land-use decision-making dynamics====
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 They cite some works of games, but they are 'RPG', instead of 'experiments'. They cite some works of games, but they are 'RPG', instead of 'experiments'.
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 =====Others===== =====Others=====
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 ====A random matching theory==== ====A random matching theory====

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